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NATALIE STOLJAR’S WISHFUL THINKING
AND ONE STEP BEYOND: WHAT SHOULD
CONCEPTUAL LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME?*
Imer B. FLO RES**
Re su men:
Ala bar el “pen sa mien to ilu so rio y bien in ten cio na do” es un ries go que es -
toy dis pues to a co rrer no so la men te en este ar tícu lo para co men tar el
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* Re vi sed ver sion of the com ment pre sen ted at Se mi na rio Pro ble ma,
Insti tu to de Inves ti ga cio nes Ju rí di cas, UNAM, May 2, 2012, on Na ta lie
Stol jar’s “In Prai se of Wish ful Thin king: A Cri ti que of Des crip ti ve/Expla na -
tory Met ho do lo gies of Law” (in this same vo lu me), which is ba sed upon
her “What Do We Want Law to Be? Phi lo sop hi cal Analy sis and the Con -
cept of Law”. (I ad dress al most in dis tinc ti vely both pa pers as if they were
one, but whe ne ver and whe re ver it is or seems ap pro pria te I will re fer to
the for mer as Pro ble ma’s pa per and to the lat ter as McMas ter’s pa per, sin -
ce it was pre sen ted in May 13, 2011 at McMas ter Uni ver sity Phi lo sophy of 
Law Con fe ren ce “The Na tu re of Law: Con tem po rary Pers pec ti ves”.)
** Pro fes sor-Re sear cher, Insti tu to de Inves ti ga cio nes Ju rí di cas (Le gal
Re search Insti tu te) and Fa cul tad de De re cho (Law School), UNAM and
Vi si ting Pro fes sor of Law, Geor ge town Uni ver sity Law Cen ter. E.mail:
imer@unam.mx. The sub tit le ex pres ses my in deb ted ness to the work of
Ro ber to Man ga bei ra Unger, in ge ne ral, and to his book What Should Le -
gal Analy sis Be co me?, Lon don: Ver so, 1996, in par ti cu lar. I am also gra -
te ful to Na ta lie Stol jar for sha ring her con cerns on le gal met ho do logy
with me and to Enri que Cá ce res, Mi chael Giu di ce, Car la Huer ta, Dan
Priel, Ve roni ca Ro driguez-Blan co and Juan Vega Gó mez for their reac -
tions to my com ment to Na ta lie. I would also like to thank the mem bers
of my clas ses over the past years, es pe cially of my Ju ris pru den ce cour se
at Geor ge town Law, be cau se it is through dis cus sion with them that
most ideas, right or wrong, have be co me what they are now. Clearly
errors are still my res pon si bi lity.
PROBLEMA
Anua rio de Fi lo so fía
y Teo ría del De re cho 6
tra ba jo de Na ta lie Stol jar sino ade más en el res to de mi pro duc ción aca -
dé mi ca. Aun cuan do voy a ana li zar su ar gu men to y voy a es tar de acuer -
do en la ma yor par te con ella, tam bién la voy a cri ti car por de te ner se un
paso an tes al adop tar la te sis de la de sea bi li dad o te sis dé bil, cuan do no
es me ra men te po si ble sino ne ce sa rio ir un paso más allá al adop tar la te -
sis de la ne ce si dad o te sis fuer te. Para tal efec to, in ten to pre sen tar al gu -
nas ra zo nes adi cio na les para apo yar el “plu ra lis mo del aná li sis (ju rí di co)
con cep tual” al dis tin guir las tres in ves ti ga cio nes o pro yec tos di fe ren tes
que es tán y de ben es tar in te gra dos y es ta ble cer la prio ri dad nor ma ti va
de uno de ellos, i.e. pres crip ti vo, in ter pre ti vo y mo ral.
Pa la bras cla ve:
Aná li sis con cep tual, ju ris pru den cia in te gra da, me to do lo gía ju -
rí di ca, plu ra lis mo ju rí di co.
Abstract:
Prais ing wish ful think ing is a se ri ous risk that I am will ing to run not only
in this ar ti cle com ment ing of Natalie Stoljar’s work but also else where in my 
own schol ar ship. Al though I will an a lyze her claims and will agree mostly
with them, I will crit i cize her for stop ping one step short adopt ing the de sir -
abil ity or weaker claim, when in it is not merely pos si ble but nec es sary to
go one step be yond ar gu ing for the ne ces sity or stron ger claim. Ac cord -
ingly, I in tend to pres ent fur ther grounds for en dors ing “con cep tual (le gal)
anal y sis plu ral ism” by dis tin guish ing the three dif fer ent in quiry or pro jects
that are and must be in te grated and stat ing the nor ma tive pri or ity of one of
them, i.e. the pre scrip tive, in ter pre tive, and moral.
Key words:
Con cep tual Anal y sis, In te gra tive Ju ris pru dence, Le gal Meth od ol -
ogy, Le gal Plu ral ism.
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-Why are you look ing at me with such con cern?
-I’m so very wor ried. Your vi tal ity’s been drained
from you. Mar riage? Is the end, I tell you.
-I think of it as the be gin ning.
-Ar ma ged don.
-Re birth.
-Re stric tion.
-Struc ture.
-An swer ing to a woman.
-Be ing in a re la tion ship. A life in mat ri mony. The pos -
si bil ity of a fam ily. Who wants to die alone?
-So, we’ll have a good old-fash ioned romp to night,
you’ll set tle down, have a fam ily, and I’ll die alone.
Ex change be tween Sherlock Holmes and Dr. John
Wat son in Sherlock Holmes: A Game of Shad ows
(2012).
[W]e call many dif fer ent forms of le gal and so cial ar -
range ments found in dif fer ent so ci et ies mar riages…
It is a mis take to say, for ex am ple, as many now do,
that the es sence of mar riage is a un ion be tween a
man and a woman so that gay mar riage is an oxy -
mo ron.
Ron ald Dworkin, Jus tice in Robes (2006).
The pur pose of mar riage is the pro cre ation of chil -
dren, and po lyg amy is not di rectly con trary to that
pur pose, though it is partly con trary since the pro cre -
ation of chil dren is not helped, in deed it is some what 
hin dered, by po lyg amy: two women will be better im -
preg nated by two men than by one.
Fran cisco de Vitoria, On Law, §123, Ar ti cle 5
(1533-4).
83
NATALIE STOLJAR’S WISHFUL THINKING
SUMMARY: I. In tro duc tion: Wish ful Think ing. II. Jhering’s
Heaven of Le gal Con cepts and Same-Sex Mar -
riage. III. Con clu sion: What Should Con cep tual
Le gal Anal y sis Be come?
I. INTRODUCTION: WISHFUL THINKING
Prais ing and even run ning my self “the se ri ous risk of wish -
ful think ing”,1 I can not be more em pa thetic —and even
sym pa thetic— with Natalie Stoljar’s con cerns and her pro -
ject as de vel oped in “What Do We Want Law to Be? Philo -
soph i cal Anal y sis and the Con cept of Law”2 and “In Praise
of Wish ful Think ing: A Cri tique of De scrip tive/Ex plan a tory
Meth od ol o gies of Law”.3 In the re cent past, I per son ally
have claimed both that (1) the de scrip tive and evaluative
but still mor ally-neu tral or non-moral ap proach4 does not
pro vide the meth od olog i cal tools re quired to op er ate ad e -
quately a pur pos ive so cial phe nom e non, like law, which has 
an un de ni able pre scrip tive char ac ter and will have at some
point to face in ter pre tive and nor ma tive is sues re gard ing
jus ti fi ca tion and le git i ma tion; and, hence, that (2) the moral 
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1 Vid. Wilfrid J. Waluchow, In clu sive Le gal Pos i tiv ism, Ox ford: Ox ford
Uni ver sity Press, 1994, p. 17.
2 Vid. Natalie Stolar, “What Do We Want Law to Be? Philo soph i cal
Anal y sis and the Con cept of Law”, in Wil Waluchow and Stefan Sciaraffa
(eds.), The Philo soph i cal Foun da tions of the Na ture of Law, Ox ford: Ox ford
Uni ver sity Press, 2013 (forth com ing).
3 Natalie Stoljar, “In Praise of Wish ful Think ing: A Cri tique of De scrip -
tive/Ex plan a tory Meth od ol o gies of Law”, Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y
Teoría del Derecho, No. 6, 2012, pp. 51-79.
4 This ap proach is usu ally as so ci ated with Julie Dick son’s po si tion,
which con sti tutes a cri tique of Ron ald Dworkin’s, John Finnis’, and to
some ex tent Fred er ick Schauer’s “di rectly evaluative le gal the ory”, and a
de fense of Jo seph Raz’s “in di rectly evaluative le gal the ory”, vid. Julie
Dick son, Eval u a tion and Le gal The ory, Ox ford and Port land, Or e gon: Hart
Pub lish ing, 2001. Vid. also Fred er ick Schauer, “The So cial Con struc tion
of the Con cept of Law. A Re ply to Julie Dick son”, Ox ford Jour nal of Le gal
Stud ies, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2005, pp. 493-501.
can nei ther be elim i nated nor in su lated from le gal phi los o -
phiz ing and the o riz ing.5
In my opin ion the pa pers have the vir tue of con sid er ing
the pos si bil ity of con nect ing dif fer ent lev els or pro jects
within le gal meth od ol ogy and can be read ei ther all the way 
down as inter-meth od olog i cal by bridg ing two dif fer ent le gal
meth od ol o gies or at least as intra-meth od olog i cal by de vel op -
ing three dif fer ent in quiry pro jects within a le gal meth od ol -
ogy, namely con cep tual (le gal) anal y sis. Al though Stoljar,
by fol low ing Sally Haslanger,6 de vel ops the last op tion in
de tail, i.e. “con cep tual anal y sis plu ral ism”, I as sume that in 
do ing so and in the pro cess of de ny ing “meth od olog i cal le -
gal pos i tiv ism” she also ex plores the con nec tions be tween
the sub stan tive pro jects of le gal pos i tiv ism —ex clu sive and
in clu sive— and its crit ics, i.e. anti- or non-le gal pos i tiv ism.
My one and only prob lem with Stoljar’s ap proach is that
in the pro cess of clar i fy ing her po si tion she stops one step
short from —or at least one step shorter than— what I ad -
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5 Let me ad vance, the con nec tion be tween these two pa pers from
Stoljar, es pe cially the one pre sented at the 2011 McMaster Uni ver sity
Phi los o phy of Law Con fer ence “The Na ture of Law: Con tem po rary Per -
spec tives” with one of my own, which was also pre sented at that same
Con fer ence and ben e fit ted from her com ments. Akin to her, I claimed that 
there are dif fer ent lev els (or pro jects) within law and le gal ra tio nal ity, and
so that a plu ral is tic ap proach was re quired not only to in te grate them into 
one but also that mo ral ity played a de fin i tive role in it. Hence, that the
meth od olog i cal ap proach to law and le gal ra tio nal ity nei ther can re main
merely or purely con cep tual nor de scrip tive and evaluative in an ar gu ably 
mor ally-neu tral or non-moral way, but at some point does —and even
must— en gage with the pre scrip tive and in ter pre tive in a non-mor ally
neu tral or openly moral way. Vid. Imer B. Flores, “The Prob lem about the
Na ture of Law vis-à-vis Le gal Ra tio nal ity Re vis ited: To wards an In te gra tive 
Ju ris pru dence”, in Wil Waluchow and Stefan Sciaraffa (eds.), The Philo -
soph i cal Foun da tions of the Na ture of Law, Ox ford: Ox ford Uni ver sity
Press, 2013 (forth com ing).
6 Vid. Sally Haslanger, “Gen der and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do
We Want Them to Be?”, Noûs, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2000, pp. 31-55; “What Are
We Talk ing About? The Se man tics and Pol i tics of So cial Kinds”, Hypatia,
Vol. 20, No. 4, 2005, pp. 10-26; and “What Good Are Our In tu itions?”, Ar -
is to te lian So ci ety Sup ple men tary Vol ume, Vol. 80, No. 1, 2006, pp. 89-118.
vised her to pur sue: one step be yond. This view not sur pris -
ingly is the one that I per son ally fa vor and ar gue for: moral
eval u a tion does and even must play a nec es sary role in law. 
On this re gard, in the McMaster’s pa per, her po si tion ap -
pears to be more or less am big u ous. For ex am ple, she af -
firmed that in an swer ing to the ques tion “What is law?”:
We must ask ques tions such as: What are the le git i mate
pur poses that we want this con cept to serve in our prac tice?
What do we want the con cept to do for us? How do we char -
ac ter ize the con cept in or der to en able it to better serve our
pur poses? An swer ing these ques tions will some times em ploy 
moral eval u a tion. It is ob vi ous there fore that I am in broad
agree ment with the po si tions taken by Dworkin, Finnis and
Perry each in a rather dif fer ent way, and per haps by Murphy 
in yet a dif fer ent way again, namely that to of fer a fully
fleshed-out an swer to the ques tion ‘What is law?’ we need to
en gage in sub stan tive moral and po lit i cal ar gu ment.
In a few words, on the one hand, by stat ing “An swer ing
these ques tions will some times em ploy moral eval u a tion”
she ap pears to con ceive it as con tin gent; but, on the other
hand, by sug gest ing “we need to en gage in sub stan tive
moral and po lit i cal ar gu ment” she seems to con sider it as
nec es sary. And so not sur pris ingly she can con clude “I am
in broad agree ment with the po si tions taken by [Ron ald]
Dworkin, [John] Finnis and [Ste phen] Perry each in a
rather dif fer ent way, and per haps by [Liam] Murphy”.7
How ever, in the Problema’s pa per she did state un am big -
u ously: “there are two pos si ble strat e gies for de ny ing meth -
od olog i cal pos i tiv ism, only one of which I adopt here.” And
so, first, she char ac ter izes the two po si tions: (1) the ne ces -
sity claim, i.e. “the po si tion that moral eval u a tion is a con -
cep tu ally nec es sary el e ment of le gal the ory be cause the o riz -
ing ei ther about so cial prac tices in gen eral or law in
par tic u lar (con cep tu ally) re quires moral and po lit i cal ar gu -
ment” (or stron ger claim); and, (2) the de sir abil ity claim, i.e.
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7 The em pha sis is mine.
“the po si tion that it is de sir able for le gal the o rists to em ploy 
moral con sid er ations be cause it is only through moral ar -
gu ment that we can an swer im por tant ques tions we care
about with re spect to law” (or weaker claim). Later on she
at tacks the ne ces sity or stron ger claim as “in cor rect”, solely 
be cause it is in her view in com pat i ble per def i ni tion with
con cep tual (le gal) anal y sis plu ral ism: “the ne ces sity claim is
false be cause cer tain log i cally pos si ble the o ret i cal strat e gies 
do not em ploy moral con sid er ations” and, thus, de fends the 
de sir abil ity or weaker claim. In short “If it is de sir able for
the o rists to em ploy moral con sid er ations, moral con sid er -
ations should not be kept out of the o riz ing, and hence
meth od olog i cal pos i tiv ism is in cor rect.”
More over, I do not be lieve that con cep tual (le gal) anal y sis
plu ral ism has to be com pat i ble with ei ther one or the other, 
but on the con trary that it can be com pat i ble with both: not 
only with the de sir abil ity or weaker claim but also with the
ne ces sity or stron ger claim, as I in tend to ex plain right
here, right now. In that sense, I think it is pos si ble to adopt 
both the con cep tual (le gal) anal y sis plu ral ism and the ne -
ces sity or stron ger claim all to gether.8 Keep in mind,
Stoljar’s words:
If I am right that there are three strat e gies of con cep tual
anal y sis, and these three strat e gies can be used to an a lyze
the con cept of law, then no sin gle strat egy is nec es sary for
con cep tual anal y sis. Meth od olog i cal pos i tiv ism as ex em pli -
fied in the mor ally-neu tral con cep tual and de scrip tive strat e -
gies is log i cally pos si ble. Thus, one can not adopt the ne ces -
sity claim; one can not ar gue against meth od olog i cal
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8 By the by, to Stoljar’s credit, she seems to ad mit this pos si bil ity
when she con cedes that “there is a stron ger nor ma tive po si tion that one
could adopt, namely that the strat egy that al lows moral con sid er ations to
be em ployed in le gal the o riz ing has nor ma tive pri or ity over the mor -
ally-neu tral strat e gies. Hence in some cases it would be not just de sir able
but mor ally re quired for a the o rist to em ploy moral con sid er ations when
the o riz ing about law. Al though I be lieve this stron ger po si tion is prob a bly
cor rect, I will not be pur su ing it here.”
pos i tiv ism by pro pos ing that moral eval u a tion is a log i cally
nec es sary el e ment in le gal the o riz ing.
As I read (le gal) plu ral ism, in gen eral, and con cep tual (le -
gal) anal y sis plu ral ism, in par tic u lar, in deed no sin gle level
or pro ject is nec es sary and much less suf fi cient on its own
as Stoljar is cor rect in point ing out. But if con cep tual anal -
y sis plu ral ism is true then a plu ral ity of lev els or pro jects is 
not merely im por tant or valu able but nec es sary and as
such a nor ma tive pri or ity of one of the dif fer ent lev els or
pro jects, to main tain a still work able or der or sys tem, is not 
merely de sir able but nec es sary too.
In other words, all the lev els or pro jects are im por tant or
valu able and even nec es sary parts of a whole. Let me in sist, 
the fact that the moral eval u a tion is not nec es sary at cer -
tain level or pro ject does not rule out that at some other
level or pro ject it is nec es sary and even that some form of
nor ma tive pri or ity of the moral eval u a tion is nec es sary. In
sum, moral eval u a tion does and even must play a nec es -
sary role in law, in gen eral, and in con cep tual (le gal) anal y -
sis, in par tic u lar.
As you can see, I am will ing to ar gue for the ne ces sity or
stron ger claim and in the fol low ing the reader will find fur -
ther grounds for it. Ac cord ingly, in the re main der of this ar -
ti cle, I pre tend to pres ent two sub sets of rea sons for con -
cep tual (le gal) anal y sis plu ral ism and for the ne ces sity or
stron ger claim, which I can clas sify as the the o ret i cal ones
fol low ing Jhering’s heaven of le gal con cepts cri tique, on the
one hand, and the prac ti cal ones fol low ing the “same-sex
mar riage” case, on the other hand. Fi nally, to con clude, I
will briefly re turn to the an swer to the ques tion on: What
should con cep tual le gal anal y sis be come?
II. JHE RING’S HEA VEN OF LEGAL CON CEPTS
        AND SAME-SEX MARRIA GE
First of all, I will like to em pha sis a cou ple of points in
which I agree with Stoljar’s pa pers, but in which I still will
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like to point her into other sources for in spi ra tion. On the
one hand, the tra di tional pic ture of con cep tual anal y sis, i.e.
“What is X?” or al ter nately “What is the na ture of X”, can
cer tainly be traced all the way back to Soc ra tes. How ever,
let me point not to Theaetetus, which is a later mid dle di a -
logue of Plato about the con cept or na ture of knowl edge,
but to Cratylus, which is a tran si tional di a logue of Plato be -
tween the early and mid dle pe ri ods about the con cept or
na ture of lan guage. Ac tu ally, most of Plato’s Di a logues can
be said to em body the clas si cal philo soph i cal ap proach:
“What is X?”9
On the other hand, the tra di tional pic ture of con cep tual
anal y sis does at tempt to re solve a con cept into nec es sary
and suf fi cient con di tions and do cor re spond to a wholly a
pri ori pro ject of re flec tion from a phi los o pher’s arm chair,
but some times it iden ti fies a clus ter of core or im por tant
fea tures, in clud ing moral ones, and is com ple mented with a 
pos te rior re flec tion, some thing like John Rawls’ “re flec tive
equi lib rium” or even H. L. A. Hart’s “crit i cal re flec tive at ti -
tude”.10
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9 Vid. Plato, Cratylus, trans. C.D.C. Reeve, In di a nap o lis: Hackett,
1998. Vid. also Plato, Theaetetus, trans. M.J. Levett, In di a nap o lis:
Hackett, 1990. 
10 Vid. John Rawls, A The ory of Jus tice, Cam bridge, Mas sa chu setts:
Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 1971, pp. 20-1, 48-51, and so. (In the re vised
ed.: 1999, pp. 18-9, 42-5 and so.) H.L.A. Hart, The Con cept of Law, Ox -
ford: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 1961, p. 56. (In the 2nd ed. “With a Post -
script ed ited by Penelope A. Bulloch and Jo seph Raz”, 1994, p. 57.) (Here -
in af ter the ref er ences will be made to the 2nd ed.) John Mikhail, El e ments
of Moral Cog ni tion: Rawls’ Lin guis tic Anal ogy and the Cog ni tive Sci ence of
Moral and Le gal Judg ment, Cam bridge: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press,
2011.
      Else where I have crit i cized Hart’s “crit i cal re flec tive at ti tude” as un der -
de vel oped by his fol low ers but en dorsed the ne ces sity of adopt ing the in -
ter nal point of view and the neediness for such “crit i cal re flec tive at ti tude” 
—or at least “some thing like” it. Vid. Imer B. Flores, “In the Dark Side of
the Con ven tion al ity The sis?”, in Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Stud ies in So -
cial, Po lit i cal and Le gal Phi los o phy. Phi los o phy of Law and of Pol i tics, Am -
ster dam: Rodopi, 2002, pp. 155-6; and “The Liv ing Tree
In ad di tion, to Mar tha C. Nussbaum,11 I have in mind
Fred er ick Schauer, who did em pha sis the im por tant —and
even valu able— fea tures fol low ing his birds’ ex am ple, i.e.
al though fly ing is some thing char ac ter is tic of al most all the
genre of birds, it is not the case of the spe cies of emus, os -
triches and pen guins, which are also birds, to the ex tent
that the only non-birds fly ing ver te brates are bats.12 My
hunch is that once we en gage in the im por tant and even
valu able, we might end not only with the mor ally im por tant 
and even valu able as well but also with some thing mor ally
nec es sary.
Sec ondly, I agree that the tra di tional pic ture of con cep -
tual anal y sis is still use ful for un der stand ing as pects of the 
con cept of law, but the role of the con cep tual should nei -
ther be over stated nor un der stated. In that sense, I could
not agree more that it is nec es sary to adopt a form of “con -
cep tual (le gal) anal y sis plu ral ism” that con nects and even
in ter con nects three dif fer ent pro jects within con cep tual
anal y sis, which nei ther ex clude nor in clude each other and
that can be in te grated into one broader pro ject: an in te gra -
tive ju ris pru dence.
For that pur pose, in what fol lows, I will re vise the core of
Stoljar’s claim, which I will di vide in the two main com po -
nents that she iden ti fies: (1) the three in qui ries or pro jects
within con cep tual (le gal) anal y sis plu ral ism; and (2) the
four dif fer ent po si tions to wards it. Let me ad vance, that in
or der to fa cil i tate the anal y sis and cri tique I will col lapse
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Constitutionalism: Fix ity and Flex i bil ity”, Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y 
Teoría del Derecho, No. 3, 2009, p. 62.
11 Vid. Mar tha C. Nussbaum, “Objectification”, Phi los o phy and Pub lic
Af fairs, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1995, pp. 249-91.
12 Vid. Fred er ick Schauer, “Ne ces sity, Im por tance, and the Na ture of
Law”, avail able for down load at the So cial Sci ence Re search Net work
Elec tronic Pa per Col lec tion: http://ssrn.com/ab stract=1594930. Vid.
also Fred er ick Schauer, “The Na ture of the Na ture of Law”, avail able for
down load at the Na ture of Law: Con tem po rary Per spec tives con fer ence
site: http://tnl.mcmaster.ca/con fer ence/pa pers/Schauer%20-%20On% 20 
the%20Nature%20of%20the%20Nature%20of%20Law.pdf.
the four dif fer ent po si tions into two and will ap ply them at
the end of this sec tion to the “same-sex mar riage” case.
On one side, Stoljar —fol low ing Haslanger— sug gests
that the tra di tional pic ture of a con cep tual in quiry or pro ject 
aims to un cover our man i fest con cept of X in ques tion, but
iden ti fies two fur ther in ter con nected in qui ries or pro jects of 
con cep tual anal y sis: a de scrip tive in quiry or pro ject that
aims to dis cover an op er a tive con cept; and an ameliorative
in quiry or pro ject that aims to yield a tar get con cept for le -
git i mate pur poses in us ing that con cept.13 Fur ther more,
Stoljar point outs in the McMaster’s pa per the way in which 
the three in qui ries or pro jects are in te grated. In her own
voice:14
For con cepts that re fer to so cial kinds or ob jec ti ve so cial
types, all three pro jects can be em plo yed to pro vi de a fu ller or 
more re sol ved ac count of the con cept. If the re is no con ver -
gen ce on the ma ni fest con cept, the theo rist might turn to an
ope ra ti ve or a tar get con cept. If the re is an in com pa ti bi lity bet -
ween the ma ni fest and the ope ra ti ve con cepts, a tar get con -
cept might be em plo yed to de ci de bet ween them, and so forth.
Since the man i fest con cept —cor re spond ing to the merely 
or purely con cep tual— will not be enough in some cases it
is clear that in do ing con cep tual anal y sis we will have to
move from-time-to-time to ward an op er a tive con cept —cor -
re spond ing to the de scrip tive, evaluative and non-moral—
and if (and only if) it turned out not to be enough to the
case at hand we will have to move to ward a tar get con cept
—cor re spond ing to the pre scrip tive, in ter pre tive and moral.
On the other, the dif fer ent po si tions that she iden ti fies
are: (1) the claim that the con cept of law is an in ter pre tive
or her me neu tic con cept and hence con cep tual anal y sis of
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13 By the by, let me sug gest that Schauer’s pre scrip tive con cep tual
anal y sis par al lels Haslanger’s ameliorative pro ject and can also be la beled 
as pur pos ive in quiry. Cfr. Haslanger, “What Are We Talk ing About?...”,
cit., pp. 11, 12, 23-4 fn 1; and, Schauer, “The So cial Con struc tion of the
Con cept of Law…”, cit., p. 500.
14 The em pha sis is mine.
law must em ploy moral con sid er ations (Dworkin and
Perry);15 (2) the claim that con cedes that it is an in ter pre -
tive or her me neu tic con cept, but that de nies that it has to
em ploy moral con sid er ations and so con cep tual anal y sis
can re main still de scrip tive and non-moral but not merely or 
purely con cep tual (Hart and Leiter);16 (3) the claim that
con cep tual anal y sis is point less since there is no con ver -
gence on com mon us age (Murphy);17 and (4) the claim that
con cep tual anal y sis is evaluative at a metatheoretical level
but still de scrip tive and non-moral (Raz and Dick son).18
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15 Vid. Ron ald Dworkin, Tak ing Rights Se ri ously, 2nd ed. with a Re ply
to Crit ics, Cam bridge, Mas sa chu setts: Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 1978;
and Law’s Em pire, Cam bridge, Mas sa chu setts: Har vard Uni ver sity Press,
1986. Vid. also Ste phen R. Perry, S. “Hart’s Meth od olog i cal Pos i tiv ism”, in 
Jules Coleman (ed.), Hart’s Post script: Es says on the Post script to The Con -
cept of Law, Ox ford: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 2000, pp. 311-54.
16 Vid. Hart, The Con cept of Law, cit., es pe cially “Pref ace”, p. vi: “Not -
with stand ing its con cern with anal y sis the book may also be re garded as
an es say in de scrip tive so ci ol ogy; for the sug ges tion that in qui ries into the 
mean ings of words merely throw light on words is false” and “Post script”,
pp. 239-40: “My aim in this book was to pro vide a the ory of what law is
which is both gen eral and de scrip tive. It is gen eral in the sense that it is
not tied to any par tic u lar le gal sys tem or le gal cul ture, but seeks to give an 
ex plan a tory and clar i fy ing ac count of law as a com plex so cial and po lit i cal 
in sti tu tion with a rule-gov erned (and in that sense ‘nor ma tive’) as pect…
My ac count is de scrip tive in that it is mor ally neu tral and has no jus ti fi ca -
tory aims: it does not seek to jus tify or com mend on moral or other
grounds the forms and struc tures which ap pear in my gen eral ac count of
law, though a clear un der stand ing of these is, I think, an im por tant pre -
lim i nary to any use ful moral crit i cism of law.” (The em pha sis is in the
orig i nal.) Vid. also Brian Leiter, “Le gal Re al ism, Hard Pos i tiv ism, and the
Lim its of Con cep tual Anal y sis”, in Coleman (ed.), Hart’s Post script…, cit.,
pp. 355-70; and “Be yond the Hart/Dworkin De bate: The Meth od ol ogy
Prob lem in Ju ris pru dence”, Amer i can Jour nal of Ju ris pru dence, Vol. 48,
2003, pp. 17-51.
17 Vid. Liam Murphy, “The Po lit i cal Ques tion of the Con cept of Law”, in
Coleman (ed.), Hart’s Post script…, cit., pp. 371-409.
18 Vid. Jo seph Raz, “Au thor ity, Law and Mo ral ity”, in Eth ics in the Pub -
lic Do main, Ox ford: Clar en don Press, 1994, pp. 194-221. Vid. also Dick -
son, Eval u a tion and Le gal The ory, cit., es pe cially pp. 129-30: “In this type
Re gard ing (3) I take that the claim that con cep tual anal y -
sis is point less is over ex ag ger ated on two grounds: first, if
the lack of com mon us age is a de fin i tive pa ram e ter, al most
ev ery thing re gard ing so cial kinds, such as law, is point less, 
and the few things in which there might be a con ver gence
of com mon us age will be most prob a bly un im por tant or at
least un in ter est ing;19 and, sec ond, it is pre cisely this di ver -
gence —or dis agree ment— on com mon us age that trig gers
the need for fur ther con cep tual anal y sis. In my opin ion, (2)
and (4) re gard less of con ced ing or not that it is in ter pre tive
can be re duced to a sim i lar meth od olog i cal po si tion that
claims that con cep tual anal y sis is de scrip tive and evaluative
but non-moral, whereas (1) claims that it is in ter pre tive and
cer tainly moral, and hence we need to en gage in sub stan -
tive moral and po lit i cal ar gu ment.20
In that sense, since the pos si bil ity of a merely or purely
con cep tual anal y sis has been ruled out it seems clear that
the de bate on what should con cep tual le gal anal y sis be -
come is be tween de scrip tive, evaluative and non-moral (2
and 4), and pre scrip tive, in ter pre tive and moral (1 and 3). In
other words, the de bate is whether con cep tual anal y sis can
re main a de scrip tive in quiry or pro ject aim ing to pro vide op -
er a tive con cepts or it has to be also a pre scrip tive,
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of le gal the ory, [i.e. in di rectly evaluative le gal the ory,] it is nec es sary to
make evaluative judge ments which pick out the most im por tant or sig nif i -
cant fea tures of the law to be ex plained, but in do ing so, the le gal the o rist
is not ren der ing moral judge ment on those fea tures, nor at tempt ing to
show them in their best moral and po lit i cal light sim ply in or der to iden tify 
what they are.”
19 Vid. Ron ald Dworkin, “Hart’s Post script and the Point of Po lit i cal
Phi los o phy”, in Jus tice in Robes, Cam bridge, Mas sa chu setts: Har vard
Uni ver sity Press, 2006, p. 185.
20 By the way, let me sug gest that ac tu ally (3) claims that con cep tual
anal y sis is point less if it re mains merely or purely con cep tual and even
de scrip tive, evaluative and non-moral, and so tak ing sides with (1) and
not nec es sar ily with a strong skep ti cism about the value of con cep tual
the o riz ing. Cfr. Rich ard Posner, Law and Le gal The ory in Eng land and
Amer ica, Ox ford: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 1997, pp. 1-5.
ameliorative and pur pos ive in quiry or pro ject aim ing to pro -
vide tar get con cepts.
For the pur pose of an a lyz ing and crit i ciz ing these two op -
tions, let me pro ceed first by re call ing the ex am ple of
“tardy” that Stoljar bor rows from Haslanger. If “tardy” is
used in lo cal school dis tricts by “de fin ing as tardy any child 
who ar rives at school af ter the bell rings at 7.50 am” and
“School of fi cials who are charged with im ple ment ing the
pol icy re port that the mean ing of ‘tardy’ cor re sponds to the
def i ni tion; hence their man i fest con cept ‘tardy’ cor re sponds
to the def i ni tion.” But sup pose that in a “par tic u lar school
there is a 5 min ute morn ing lineup af ter the bell rings but
be fore stu dents have to go to their class rooms, and sup pose 
in this school teach ers only mark chil dren tardy if they ar -
rive in class late. In this school, the op er a tive con cept of
tardy di verges from the man i fest con cept un der which chil -
dren are tardy if they ar rive af ter the bell at 7.50. Now sup -
pose a school in spec tor ar rives and asks why chil dren who
ar rive af ter the bell are not marked tardy. The re ply might
be: ‘com ing a few min utes late for lineup but get ting to
class on time is not re ally tardy’.” Since the im pli ca tion is
far from ob vi ous let me quote Haslanger via Stoljar:21
As Haslanger points out, a re ply such as this im plies that
there is ‘a fur ther way of think ing about what tar di ness “re -
ally is” that should take us into nor ma tive ques tions: Should 
we have the cat e gory of ‘tardy’ in our school dis trict? If so,
how should it be de fined?... [T]he sit u a tion… is ripe for an
ameliorative in quiry that would have us con sider what the
point is of a prac tice of mark ing stu dents tardy, and what
def i ni tion (and cor re spond ing pol icy) would best achieve the
le git i mate pur poses’.
Since I will be at trib ut ing to H. L. A. Hart the de scrip tive,
evaluative and non-moral in quiry or pro ject aim ing to op er a -
tive con cepts, I will like to ad vance an ob jec tion to the pos -
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21 Stoljar quot ing Haslanger, “What Are We Talk ing About?...”, cit., p. 15.
si bil ity of some one sug gest ing that Hart em bod ies the con -
cep tual (le gal) anal y sis plu ral ism and that he did em brace
the three strat e gies by in clud ing the pre scrip tive, in ter pre -
tive and moral in quiry or pro ject aim ing to tar get con cepts.
The fact that Hart at some point did openly en dorse and
even en gage in moral crit i cism, most no ta bly in his de bate
with Lord Pat rick Devlin,22 on the le gal en force ment of mor -
als against ho mo sex ual prac tices such as sod omy, can be
better un der stood nei ther as a con cep tual nor le gal ques -
tion but as a moral one call ing not for an ex pla na tion but
for a jus ti fi ca tion. In Hart’s own voice:23
In ask ing [the ques tion whether a so ci ety has the “right” to
en force its mo ral ity by law] we are com mit ted at least to the
gen eral crit i cal prin ci ple that the use of le gal co er cion by any 
so ci ety calls for jus ti fi ca tion as some thing prima fa cie ob jec -
tion able to be tol er ated only for the sake of some coun ter -
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22 The de bate was trig gered by the ap pear ance in the United King dom,
Sep tem ber 4, 1957, of the Re port of the Com mit tee on Ho mo sex ual Of -
fences and Pros ti tu tion, better known as the Wolfenden Re port, rec om -
mend ing that ho mo sex ual prac tices be tween con sent ing adults in pri vate
should no lon ger be a crim i nal of fence. On the one hand, Lord Pat rick
Devlin de liv ered the Maccabean Lec ture in Ju ris pru dence, in the Brit ish
Acad emy, March 18, 1959, where he ar gued that a so ci ety’s shared mo ral -
ity was as nec es sary to its ex is tence as a rec og nized gov ern ment and the
jus ti fi ca tion for its en force ment by law was sim ply that the law might be
used to pre serve any thing es sen tial to so ci ety’s ex is tence. For that pur -
pose he drew the anal ogy be tween im mo ral ity, i.e. an in fringe ment of a so -
ci ety’s shared moral code, and trea son, claim ing that the sup pres sion of
such im mo ral ity was as much the law’s busi ness and jus ti fi able on the
same grounds, as the sup pres sion of sub ver sive ac tiv i ties. On the other
hand, Hart re acted crit i cally first by pub lish ing a cou ple of ar ti cles “Im -
mo ral ity and Trea son”, The Lis tener, July 30, 1959, and “The Use and
Abuse of the Crim i nal Law”, Ox ford Law yer, No. 4, 1961, and later by de -
liv er ing the Harry Camp Lec tures at Stan ford Uni ver sity, 1962. Vid. Pat -
rick Devlin, The En force ment of Mor als, Ox ford: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press,
1965. Vid. also H. L. A. Hart, Law, Lib erty, and Mo ral ity, Stan ford: Stan -
ford Uni ver sity Press, 1963; and “So cial Sol i dar ity and the En force ment of 
Mo ral ity”, Uni ver sity of Chi cago Law Re view, Vol. 35, 1967, pp. 1-13.
23 Hart, Law, Lib erty, and Mo ral ity, cit., pp. 20-1.
vail ing good. For where there is no prima fa cie ob jec tion,
wrong or evil, men do not ask for or give jus ti fi ca tions of so -
cial prac tices, though they may ask for and give ex pla na tions
of these or may at tempt to dem on strate their value.
To re in force the view that Hart con sid ers the pro jects of
con cep tual anal y sis and moral crit i cism as two dis tinct en -
ter prises fol low ing the so-called sep a ra bil ity the sis, i.e. sep -
a ra tion be tween law and mor als or more pre cisely be tween
law as it is and law as (mor ally) it ought to be, let me point
both to his “Pos i tiv ism and the Sep a ra tion of Law and Mor -
als”24 and to “Prob lems of the Phi los o phy of Law”.25
On the one hand, in his 1957 Ol i ver Wendell Holmes Lec -
ture at Har vard Law School, Hart ad vances his skep ti cism
to wards the third in quiry or pro ject as part of law or as a
le gal one, be cause he not only does con ceive it as a form of
moral crit i cism but also does not con sider it as part of the
con cep tual in quiry or pro ject that he usu ally as so ci ates
with law. Let me quote Hart at length:26
For if we adopt Rad bruch’s view, and with him and the Ger -
man courts make our pro test against evil law in the form of
an as ser tion that cer tain ru les can not be law be cau se of
their mo ral ini quity, we con fu se one of the most po wer ful,
be cau se it is the sim plest, forms of mo ral cri ti cism. If with
the Uti li ta rians we speak plainly, we say that laws may be
law but too evil to be obe yed. This is a mo ral con dem na tion
which ever yo ne can un ders tand and it ma kes an im me dia te
and ob vious claim to mo ral at ten tion. If, on the ot her hand,
we for mu la te our ob jec tion as an as ser tion that the se evil
things are not law, here is an as ser tion which many peo ple
96
IMER B. FLORES
24 Vid. H. L. A. Hart, “Pos i tiv ism and the Sep a ra tion of Law and Mor -
als”, Har vard Law Re view, Vol. 71, No. 4, Feb ru ary, 1958, pp. 593-629.
(Also pub lished in: Es says in Ju ris pru dence and Phi los o phy, Ox ford: Clar -
en don Press, 1983, pp. 49-87.)
25 Vid. H. L. A. Hart, “Prob lems of the Phi los o phy of Law”, in Es says in
Ju ris pru dence and Phi los o phy, loc. cit., pp. 88-119.
26 Hart, “Pos i tiv ism and the Sep a ra tion of Law and Mor als”, cit., pp.
620-1 (pp. 77-8).
do not be lie ve, and if they are dis po sed to con si der it at all, it 
would seem to rai se a who le host of phi lo sop hi cal is sues be -
fo re it can be ac cep ted. So per haps the most im por tant sin -
gle les son to be lear ned from this form of the de nial of the
Uti li ta rian dis tinc tion is the one that the Uti li ta rians were
most con cer ned to teach: when we have the am ple re sour ces 
of plain speech we must not pre sent the mo ral cri ti cism of
ins ti tu tions as pro po si tions of a dis pu ta ble phi lo sophy.
On the other hand, in the es say for the En cy clo pe dia of
Phi los o phy he orig i nally ad dressed two dif fer ent sets of
prob lems, namely the “Prob lems of Def i ni tion and Anal y sis” 
and the “Prob lems of the Crit i cism of Law”, and later added
the “Prob lems of Le gal Rea son ing”. Ac tu ally, in that es say,
Hart re vis its the nec es sary dis tinc tion be tween “Anal y sis
and eval u a tion” as cor re spond ing to two dif fer ent kinds of
in qui ries:27
A di vi sion bet ween in qui ries con cer ned with the analy sis of
law and le gal con cepts and tho se con cer ned with the cri ti -
cism or eva lua tion of law pri ma fa cie seems not only pos si ble 
but ne ces sary, yet the con cep tion of an eva lua ti vely neu tral
or au to no mous analy ti cal study of the law has not only been 
con tes ted but also has been ta ken by some mo dern cri tics to 
be the hall mark of a sha llow and use less le gal po si ti vism
alle gedly un con cer ned with the va lues or ends which men
pur sue through law.
In that sense, it is not sur pris ingly that it is Dworkin, one
of the most con spic u ous mod ern crit ics of le gal pos i tiv ism,
in gen eral, and of Hart’s ver sion, in par tic u lar, who can be
con sider as the best ex am ple of the pre scrip tive, in ter pre tive
and moral in quiry or pro ject aim ing to tar get con cepts within 
con cep tual (le gal) anal y sis plu ral ism with his “con struc tive
in ter pre ta tion” and his “stages of in ter pre ta tion”: “preinter-
pretive”, “in ter pre tive” and “post-in ter pre tive”.28
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27 Hart, “Prob lems of the Phi los o phy of Law”, cit., pp. 109-10.
28 Vid. Dworkin, Law’s Em pire, cit., pp. 52-3, and 65-8.
More over, I will like to point out to an ad di tional pos si bil -
ity that can be traced all the way back to Rudolf von
Jhering’s and his es say “Im Juristischen Begriffshimmel”,
i.e. “In the Heaven of Le gal Con cepts”.29 Jhering was the
first to crit i cize sa tir i cally and sys tem at i cally within the
Ger man tra di tion the Begriff Jurisprudenz, i.e. Con cep tual
Ju ris pru dence, for its ten dency to pre tend that le gal anal y -
sis can re main merely or purely con cep tual, when as he
him self ac knowl edged: “It ac tu ally be came sec ond na ture to 
me to ques tion the pur pose of all le gal the o ries.”30 Ac tu ally,
Jhering’s sa tir i cal cri tique not only has strik ing par al lels
with Ol i ver Wendell Holmes’ “cyn i cal acid”31 but also has
been the source of in spi ra tion for two well know re ac tions in
the An glo-speak ing world in both sides of the At lan tic: one,
more rad i cal com ing from the Amer i can le gal thought by Fe -
lix S. Co hen;32 and, other, more mod er ate com ing from the
Brit ish an a lyt i cal ju ris pru dence by H. L. A. Hart him self.33
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29 Vid. Rudolf von Jhering, “In the Heaven for Le gal Con cepts: A Fan -
tasy”, trans. Char lotte L. Levy, Tem ple Law Quar terly, Vol. 58, 1985, pp.
799-842. (Orig i nally published as “Im Juristischen Begriffshimmel: ein
Phantasienbild” (1884), in Scherz und Ernst in der Jurisprudenz, Leip zig:
Breitkopf & Hartel, 1885.) (Some se lec tions ap peared for the first time
trans lated into Eng lish in Mor ris R. Co hen and Fe lix S. Co hen (eds.),
Read ings in Ju ris pru dence and Phi los o phy of Law, Boston: Lit tle, Brown
and Com pany, 1951; and, New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951, pp. 678-89.)
30 Jhering, “In the Heaven for Le gal Con cepts…”, cit., p. 823 (the em -
pha sis is mine). Vid. also Rudolf von Jhering, Law as a Means to an End,
trans. Isaac Husik, Boston: The Boston Book Com pany, 1913.
31 Vid. Ol i ver Wendell Holmes, “The Path of the Law”, Har vard Law Re -
view, Vol. 10, no. 8, 1897, pp. 461-2: “You see how the vague cir cum fer -
ence of the no tion of duty shrinks and at the same time grows more pre -
cise when we was hit with cyn i cal acid, and ex pel ev ery thing ex cept the
ob ject of our study, the op er a tions of the law.” (The em pha sis is mine.)
32 Vid. Fe lix S. Co hen, “Tran scen den tal Non sense and the Func tional
Ap proach”, Co lum bia Law Re view, Vol. 35, No. 6, 1935, pp. 809-49.
33 Vid. H. L. A. Hart, “Jhering’s Heaven of Con cepts and Mod ern An a -
lyt i cal Ju ris pru dence”, in Es says in Ju ris pru dence and Phi los o phy, loc.
cit., pp. 265-77.
On the one hand, Co hen —in his em i nent and fa mous ar -
ti cle that be gins with a ref er ence to Jhering’s cu ri ous
dream about the heaven of le gal con cepts— in sisted that it
was nec es sary both to aban don the “tran scen den tal non -
sense”, which he equated with the merely or purely con cep -
tual, and to adopt a “func tional ap proach” in stead. Ac cord -
ing to Co hen ev ery so cial in sti tu tion or bi o log i cal or gan has
a “pur pose” in life, and is to be judged good or bad as it
achieves or fails to achieve this “pur pose”.34 In a short sen -
tence “A thing is what it does”.35
To re in force the sig nif i cance of the func tional ap proach,
Co hen not only traces some of its ba sic con tri bu tions: (1)
the erradication of mean ing less con cepts; (2) the abate ment 
of mean ing less ques tions; (3) the re def i ni tion of con cepts;
and (4) the re di rec tion of re search, but also con sid ers its
bear ings upon four tra di tional le gal prob lems: (1) the def i ni -
tion of law; (2) the na ture of le gal rules and con cepts; (3)
the the ory of le gal de ci sions; and (4) the role of le gal crit i -
cism. For the pur poses of this ar ti cle suf fices to say that
Co hen rec og nized:36
Holmes and, one should add, Hohfeld have of fered a log i cal
ba sis for the re def i ni tion of ev ery le gal con cept in em pir i cal
terms, i.e. in terms of ju di cial de ci sions. The ghost-world of
super-nat u ral le gal en ti ties to whom courts del e gate the
moral re spon si bil ity of de cid ing cases van ishes; in its place
we see le gal con cepts as pat terns of ju di cial be hav ior, be hav -
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      Else where I have pointed out that Hart’s meth od ol ogy —and even his
strat egy— has a strong ten dency to wards mod er ate ap proaches, which
re sem bles Ar is totle’s “doc trine of the mean”. Vid. Imer B. Flores, “H. L. A.
Hart’s Mod er ate In de ter mi nacy The sis Re con sid ered: In Be tween Scylla
and Charybdis?”, Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho, No.
5, 2011, pp. 151-2.
34 Vid. Co hen, “Tran scen den tal Non sense and the Func tional Ap -
proach”, cit., pp. 821-2.
35 Ibi dem, p. 826.
36 Ibi dem, pp. 828-9.
ior which af fects hu man lives for better or worse and is
there fore sub ject to moral crit i cism.
On the other hand, Hart —in his prom i nent and no to ri -
ous es say that ad dresses Jhering’s sat ire of the heaven of
le gal con cepts— im mu nizes mod ern an a lyt i cal ju ris pru -
dence from that cri tique with the “open tex ture” of lan -
guage.37
In that sense, Hart, first, dis tin guishes five dif fer ent
though re lated ab er ra tions of le gal thought which are the
in tel lec tual fail ings against which Jhering’s sat ire is di -
rected: (1) the ex ces sive pre oc cu pa tion with con cepts con -
sid ered in ab strac tion from the con di tions un der which
they have to be ap plied in real life; (2) the blind ness to the
so cial and in di vid ual in ter ests which must be con sid ered,
to gether with other prac ti cal prob lems, in the use and de -
vel op ment of le gal con cepts; (3) the be lief that it is pos si ble
to dis tin guish be tween the es sence and the le gal con se -
quences of a le gal rule or con cept; (4) the ig no rance of the
ends and pur poses of law; and (5) the false as sim i la tion of
the con cepts and meth ods of le gal sci ence to math e mat ics
to the ex tent that all le gal rea son ing is a mat ter of pure cal -
cu la tion in which the con tents of the le gal con cepts are un -
folded by log i cal de duc tion.
Later on, he re calls that Holmes di rected the same cri -
tique “not against the o ret i cal ju rists [as Jhering did] but
against judges and prac ti cal law yers”, i.e. “an ex ces sive re li -
ance on ‘logic’ in de cid ing cases”.38 And pointed out to the
root of this in tel lec tual er ror:39
The fun da men tal er ror con sists in the be lief that le gal con -
cepts are fixed and closed in the sense that it is pos si ble to
de fine them exhaustively in terms of a set of nec es sary and
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suf fi cient con di tions; so that for any real or imag i nary case it 
is pos si ble to say with cer tainty whether it falls un der the
con cept or does not; the con cept ei ther ap plies or it does not: 
it is log i cally closed (begrenzt). This would mean that the ap -
pli ca tion of a con cept to a given case is a sim ple log i cal op er -
a tion con ceived as a kind of un fold ing of what is al ready
there, and, in sim pler An glo-Amer i can for mu la tion, it leads
to the be lief that the mean ing of all le gal rules is fixed and
pre de ter mined be fore any con crete ques tions of their ap pli -
ca tion arises.
On the con trary, Hart claimed: “all le gal rules and con -
cepts are ‘open’; and when an unenvisaged case arises we
must make a fresh choice, and in do ing so elab o rate our le -
gal con cepts, adapt ing them to so cially de sir able ends.”40 In 
that sense, Hart rec og nized, fol low ing Friedrich Waismann
the Porosität der Begriffe:41
This is a phrase used by a close ad her ent of Wittgenstein’s,
for a most im por tant fea ture of most em pir i cal con cepts and
not merely le gal con cepts, namely, that we have no way of
fram ing rules of lan guage which are ready for all imag in able
pos si bil i ties. How ever com plex our def i ni tions may be, we
can not ren der them so pre cise so that they are de lim ited in
all pos si ble di rec tions and so that for any given case we can
say def i nitely that the con cept ei ther does or does not ap ply
to it. ‘Sup pose I come across a be ing that looks like a man,
speaks like a man, be haves like a man, and is only one foot
tall, shall I say it is a man?’ Hence there can be no fi nal and
ex haus tive def i ni tions of con cepts, even in sci ence. ‘The no -
tion of gold seems to be de fined with ab so lute pre ci sion, say, 
by the spec trum of gold with its char ac ter is tic lines. But
what should we say if a sub stance was dis cov ered which
looked like gold, sat is fied all the chem i cal tests for gold, but
emit ted a new sort of ra di a tion?’ As we can never elim i nate
such pos si bil i ties of un fore seen sit u a tions emerg ing, we can
never be sure of cov er ing all pos si bil i ties. We can only re de -
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fine and re fine our con cepts to meet the new sit u a tions when 
they arise. This rec og ni tion of the Porosität or, as the Eng lish 
call it, ‘open tex ture’ of con cepts, is, as I say, a pow er ful fea -
ture of the phi los o phy in spired by the mod ern form of an a -
lyt i cal ju ris pru dence.
In my opin ion, both Co hen and Hart did tran scend the
first con cep tual in quiry or pro ject mov ing to ward the other
in qui ries or pro jects. More over it is clear that only one did
go all the way to the third pre scrip tive, ameliorative and
pur pos ive in quiry or pro ject. On one side, Hart did in fact
com ple mented the first con cep tual in quiry or pro ject of
man i fest con cept with the de scrip tive in quiry or pro ject of
op er a tive con cept, by re de fin ing our le gal con cepts and by
adapt ing them to so cially de sir able ends, but claims that it
is pos si ble to re main value-free fol low ing the sep a ra bil ity
the sis. On the other, Co hen can em brace even the pre scrip -
tive, ameliorative and pur pos ive in quiry or pro ject be cause
pre cisely through a the ory of val ues and le gal crit i cism he
can con nect the dif fer ent in qui ries or pro jects:42
The pos i tive task of de scrip tive le gal sci ence can not, there -
fore, be en tirely sep a rated from the task of le gal crit i cism.
The col lec tion of so cial facts with out a se lec tive cri te rion of
hu man val ues pro duces hor rid wil der ness of use less sta tis -
tics. The re la tion be tween pos i tive le gal sci ence and le gal
crit i cism is not a re la tion of tem po rary pri or ity, but of mu -
tual de pend ence. Le gal crit i cism is empty with out ob jec tive
de scrip tion of the causes and con se quences of le gal de ci -
sions. Le gal de scrip tion is blind with out guid ing light of a
the ory of val ues. It is through the un ion of ob jec tive le gal sci -
ence and a crit i cal the ory of so cial val ues that our un der -
stand ing of the hu man sig nif i cance of law will be en riched. It 
is loy alty to this un ion of dis tinct dis ci plines that will mark
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what ever is of last ing im por tance in con tem po rary le gal sci -
ence and le gal phi los o phy.
Be fore con clud ing this sec tion let me try to ap ply the
con cep tual (le gal) anal y sis plu ral ism to the con tro ver sial
con cept of “mar riage” as ap plied to “same-sex mar riage”.43
First, as sume that most peo ple con sider the man i fest con -
cept of “mar riage” —re gard less of re li gious con no ta tions or
not— as the “law ful or le gal un ion be tween a man and a
woman, i.e. hus band and wife” to the ex tent that “same-sex 
mar riage” seems in deed an oxy mo ron. Sec ond, imag ine that 
most peo ple have come to terms with the op er a tive con cept
of “mar riage” as the “state of be ing united to a per son of the 
op po site sex as hus band or wife in a con sen sual and con -
trac tual re la tion ship rec og nized by law” and as such as “the 
le gal in sti tu tion that rec og nizes mu tual rights and du ties or 
re cip ro cal ben e fits and bur dens that de rive of such close or
in ti mate un ion and the co-re spon si bil ity that that re la tion -
ship en tails upon the pos si bil ity of found ing a fam ily and
bear ing chil dren”. Third, sup pose that at least some peo ple
be come sen si tive to the prob lem of “same-sex mar riage”
and its even tual rec og ni tion be yond other al ter na tives such
as “civil un ions” to the ex tent that it is nec es sary to en gage
in the quest for a tar get con cept of “mar riage” that cov ers
—or is ex tended to cover— it.
In deed, the merely and purely con cep tual ap proach,
which is closely linked to the man i fest con cept will not help
at all to solve the prob lem, since it tends —or most prob a -
bly will tend— to treat the “un ion of hus band and wife” as
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nec es sary and suf fi cient con di tions, and hence do not move 
from there. It is worth men tion ing that in clas si cal Ro man
Law: “mat ri mony” and “pat ri mony” re ferred to the re spec -
tive bur dens of the ma ter, i.e. the mother, to bear the chil -
dren, and the pa ter, i.e. fa ther, to pro vide the means to the
sub sis tence of the fam ily, to the ex tent than in a orig i nal
—and even re mote— un der stand ing “mar riage” might cer -
tainly pre sup posed a man and a woman, i.e. a hus band
and a wife. How ever, in our con tem po rary so ci et ies both the 
mother and the fa ther share —or can share— the ben e fits
and the bur dens of both bear ing the chil dren and pro vid ing 
the means for the sub sis tence of the fam ily. In ad di tion, ei -
ther one or the other does carry —or can carry— such bur -
dens and ben e fits alone. To the ex tent that in both cases
the tra di tional con cep tion of the un ion of a man and a
woman as hus band and wife is no lon ger nec es sary and
much less suf fi cient. Keep in mind not only the sin gle-par -
ent fam i lies, but also the as sisted re pro duc tion mech a -
nisms and sur ro gate moth er hood, which have in creased the 
pos si bil i ties of found ing a fam ily and bear ing chil dren be -
yond the tra di tional pic ture of a man and a woman with
their re spec tive and spe cific roles as hus band and wife pro -
cre at ing chil dren.
In a sim i lar fash ion, the de scrip tive, evaluative and
non-moral ap proach is not likely to be help ful to solve the
prob lem ei ther, since it pre tends —or will pre tend— to re -
main value-free it will be stuck with the op er a tive con cept of 
“mar riage”, and so will not pro vide —or be able to pro vide— 
the tar get con cept re quired for the ac tual rec og ni tion of
“same-sex mar riage”. It is worth not ing that by not even
con sid er ing the pos si bil ity of dis cuss ing whether “same-sex
mar riage” is jus ti fied or not, this ap proach ar gu ably re -
mains ex plan a tory in a neu tral and non-moral way, when
on the con trary it some how re in forces the view that
same-sex mar riage is —or still— not le git i mate.
In that sense, it is nec es sary to adopt the pre scrip tive,
in ter pre tive and moral ap proach in the quest for a tar get
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con cept of “mar riage”. In the search, in stead of ask ing for
the el e ments em bed ded in the man i fest con cept, such as
the un ion of a man and a woman, or for the rights and du -
ties that are rec og nized in the op er a tive con cept, we must
ques tion: what is (or even are) the pur pose(s) of “mar -
riage”? Is the pur pose of mar riage the pro cre ation of chil -
dren or is it the pos si bil ity of found ing a fam ily and bear -
ing chil dren? Anal o gously, is it jus ti fied to ex clude or
le git i mate to in clude “same-sex” re la tion ships on the con -
cept of “mar riage”? Is even some sort of ame lio ra tion or
pre scrip tion needed: Are the ben e fits and bur dens of a
“mar riage” gen der de pend ent or not? And if not can or
must we treat “same-sex” part ner ships as “mar riages” to
the ex tent that “same-sex mar riage” is clearly not an oxy -
mo ron.
III. CONCLUSION: WHAT SHOULD CONCEPTUAL
       LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME?
To con clude let me in sist that con cep tual le gal anal y sis
can nei ther re main merely or purely con cep tual nor de scrip -
tive, evaluative and non-moral and that the third pre scrip -
tive, in ter pre tive and moral in quiry or pro ject is much better
than the al ter na tives, and thus it is not only nec es sary but
also has a nor ma tive pri or ity over them.
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